Summary

To the surprise of few, Congress is once again failing to function. Congress is in a pickle, and is structurally unable to return to anything resembling “regular order”; The reform or renewal of Section 702 (which allows the infamous ‘backdoor searches’ on American citizens) may be kicked down the road to the spring as a result; we should watch carefully who becomes the new Ranking Minority member of the House Judiciary Committee.

Background

The budget process in Congress is so broken that it has only “worked” (in the sense of having all 12 appropriations bills pass both houses on time) four times in the last forty years. Congress has increasingly relied not on the individual committees, but on the leaders of the House and Senate to pass “omnibus” appropriations bills, and to draft “continuing resolutions” (or CRs) to keep the government open in the interim at existing funding levels.

The strategy of threatening repeated shutdowns of the government, in the manner of Sen. Ted Cruz and the Freedom Caucus, has proved highly successful for Republicans. Not only have voters not punished them for it; voters have rewarded them by giving Republicans control of the House, the Senate and the Presidency. In response, the bureaucratic state – the officials in senior civil service positions – have tried to minimize the damage of shutdowns by defining which employees and departments are essential enough to not be shut down.

In practice, this means that the kinder and more laudable parts of the federal government – the national parks, help for the elderly and disabled, scientific grantmaking – get shut down, but the government’s mass surveillance programs and the bloated Department of Defense get to continue spending money like water for the sake of “national security.”

The 702 surveillance reform debate

702’s surveillance authorities expire as of December 31. All the time is being sucked up with arguments over whether there will be an omnibus spending bill, and if so, what compromises will be acceptable to both Democrats and the Freedom Caucus. The deadline to fund the government is this Friday. We’re expecting there to be a two-week “continuing resolution” Friday to give space for a broader “omnibus” spending bill to pass by December 22, enabling Congressmembers to head home for Christmas and New Year’s. So what will happen to 702?

Well, the intelligence community has begun to float the idea that maybe the legal authorities for mass surveillance don’t absolutely need to be renewed by December 31 after all. This is because mass surveillance depends on programmatic “certificates” issued by the FISA Court. These were last approved on an annual basis on April 26, giving the intelligence community potentially four extra months to persuade Congress to let them continue doing an end-run around constitutional protections for US persons before they really start to panic.

If that happens, it will provide more space for reformers as well, because of an absence of congressional consensus to formally renew these authorities. At the same time, it may be that the leadership of House Judiciary will change. John Conyers, the ranking minority member, has retired under a cloud of sexual harassment allegations. Rep. Jerrold Nadler is the acting ranking member, but it looks like ardent surveillance reformer Rep. Zoe Lofgren is thinking of challenging him for the position. If she were to become the ranking member, it would substantially brighten the prospects for real reform of 702 surveillance authorities.

Mass surveillance should be debated on its own, not reapproved quickly in the early hours of the morning at the last possible moment when nobody is looking. Four months may give us the time we need to get Congress to a better place on 702 mass surveillance.

Fixing The Problem

The hard truth is that the broad problem of the collapse of regular order in Congress is very unlikely to be fixed, because fixing it requires members of Congress to act against their immediate interests. If the recent tax bill had not been stampeded through with no hearings and no time for anybody to read it through, it would not have passed, and Republicans would have no victory to go home with to their voters. There are no votes in restoring regular order, and no officeholder will lose office as a result of Congress’s spectacular and increasing dysfunction. A president so passionately committed to process that he or she did not mind not having a policy legacy of any kind, could restore regular order by vetoing any bill not passed in a procedurally correct manner; but it seems unlikely that Congress can correct it on its own. The best we can manage is Senators who will bleat about how terrible the process is, but then vote for the result anyway.

Sign the petition at dontlettrumpspyonus.com!

 

Section 702 Lets Spy Agencies Snoop on Americans – Without a Warrant.

In an end run around the Constitution, spy agencies have warped Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act into a way to unconstitutionally snoop on Americans.

The law was intended to allow intelligence agencies to monitor communications of foreign individuals outside the United States. But spy agencies like the NSA have claimed this authority allows them to scan through and collect the emails and phone calls of innocent Americans. Then, the government routinely does “backdoor searches” of this information, where they may look up information about U.S. persons, even for reasons completely unrelated to intelligence gathering.

It’s the same law the NSA claims justified the scandalous programs uncovered by Edward Snowden, like the PRISM program, which forces tech companies to turn over data on their servers, and Upstream collection, which automatically searches all internet traffic that crosses tapped lines connecting the U.S. with the rest of the world.

Flying in the face of the Fourth Amendment, the government searches this information specifically for Americans at least tens of thousands of times a year without a warrant, without evidence of a crime, and without independent oversight.

The so-called “USA Liberty Act” (H.R. 3989), which was recently introduced in the House, should be significantly improved to match the forthcoming strong surveillance reform being proposed by Senators Wyden and Paul. We’re disappointed that strong reformers in the House, such as Rep. John Conyers and Rep. Jerrold Nadler, have allowed their good name to be used to give the impression that the “USA Liberty Act” is anywhere near what is needed. Here’s why it falls so far short:

H.R.3989 doesn’t stop backdoor searches, which is when the government searches through the hundreds of millions of communications it collects yearly for information on Americans and people on U.S. soil – all without a warrant. Instead, the bill okays accessing and sharing this information for foreign intelligence purposes, a loophole big enough to drive a truck through.

It fails to permanently end “about” collection, an illegal practice the NSA says they’ve stopped that allows for warrantless spying on Americans’ communications that merely mention an intelligence target. Collections should be limited to communications that are “to” or “from” a target.

It doesn’t prevent the government from secretly using surveillance information in court against defendants. Despite tens of thousands of searches by the government of Section 702 data, only a handful of defendants have ever received notice of it – and only after the Department of Justice was caught misleading the Supreme Court about its practices.

It doesn’t stop Section 702 information from being used in investigations and prosecutions that have nothing to do with national security, because the bill doesn’t place any meaningful limits on when and how data collected under Section 702 can be shared with other agencies or used in court.

It gives the NSA too many free passes. The bill adds some transparency measures but doesn’t enforce them, giving the NSA leeway to ignore transparency reports to Congress, and only a small amount of information would trickle out to the public. And there’s no independent oversight into how President Trump and Attorney General Sessions interpret the law.

 

Spying Powers Are Already Being Abused. Under Trump Things Could Get Far Worse

Even before an authoritarian like Trump came to power, the spying powers on the books were consistently abused. The government has shown a persistent inability to follow rules that are supposed to protect Americans, as chronicled in a 2017 report by Demand Progress. Judges on the FISA Court have called the violations “a very serious Fourth Amendment issue” and complained of “an institutional ‘lack of candor’” from the spy agencies.

Surveillance powers are still being turned against activists and people of color. Muslim student associations on college campuses are infiltrated and disrupted; protesters against pipelines at Standing Rock and elsewhere are targets; and Trump’s FBI just this month was revealed to have created a new designation of “black identity extremists” to target the Black Lives Matter movement. With Trump’s clear authoritarian impulses and tendency to target vulnerable populations, Congress extending these spying powers to Trump would be catastrophic.

 

Sen. Ron Wyden and Sen. Rand Paul Get It Right with the USA RIGHTS Act

By comparison, the USA RIGHTS Act is expected to end backdoor searches, permanently ban “about” collection, and provides notice when intelligence information is used in criminal proceedings. It also is expected to contain a number of additional important provisions, including strengthening transparency around FISA court opinions, preventing solely domestic surveillance under Section 702, and much more.

 

October 5, 2017USA Liberty Act Allows FBI’s End-Run Around The Constitution To Continue

On Thursday, the House Judiciary Committee will be filing the so-called “USA
Liberty Act”, an attempt to deal with the fact that the main statutory authority for the
government’s mass surveillance programs is due to expire December 31.

The product of lengthy negotiations between ranking minority member Rep. John Conyers (DMI),
committee chair Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) and others, it unfortunately showcases that a
bipartisan solution is not always a good one.

“The least the bill could have done,” says Restore The Fourth National Chair Alex Marthews, “would have been to fix the backdoor searches problem.”1

An unknown, but probably very large, number of Americans’ communications are being collected by the NSA’s systems without a warrant ‘for foreign intelligence purposes’, and then exploited by domestic agencies like the FBI for use in ordinary criminal investigations of all kinds. It’s common for the FBI to claim a connection of an investigation to foreign intelligence or counterterrorism, even when the `connection’ is nothing more than `the suspect read something on the Internet or traveled abroad.’2

The USA Liberty Act would still allow the FBI to warrantlessly search the NSA’s stored communications based on such a claim. It says a warrant is needed if the FBI already has a domestic crime it’s investigating, and wants to find more evidence among the content of Americans’ communications held by the NSA; but (a) it requires no warrant for metadata hits anyway, and (b) those aren’t the really worrying situations.

Instead, we’re worried about the stage where the FBI doesn’t really have a crime in mind yet, but is trying to find dirt on people. It has been historically very easy for them to claim a “foreign intelligence” connection in the case of any immigrant, or a “counterterrorism” connection in the case of any Muslim; effectively, if this is codified into law, the Fourth Amendment might as well be a dead letter for such people’s online communications. Under the practice of “parallel construction”, the FBI actually starts with a person of interest, uses NSA data to find the initial evidence of a crime, and then “backfills” a plausible chain of non-NSA evidence so that their use of intelligence-derived information is not challengeable in court.3 This bill won’t fix that. Most
Americans brought up on charges based on NSA-derived information are never told where that evidence came from. We don’t even know in aggregate or in general an estimate of how many Americans NSA’s “PRISM” and “UPSTREAM” programs, governed by Section 702, have had their data warrantlessly seized; Congressmembers have been asking for six years for an estimate, and the intelligence community has stolidly refused to give one.4

This bill does some good things. For example, it extends whistleblower protections to
intelligence community contractors. It codifies a ban on so-called “about collection.” But given all we have learned as a nation about mass surveillance on us since December 2012, when this law last came up for renewal, it should at the very least require a warrant for all domestic agencies’ searches of intelligence databases.

1 For more on Restore The Fourth, see www.restorethe4th.com.
2 See, among many others, the case of Tarek Mehanna of Sudbury, MA
3 See a fuller explanation at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction.
4 This sorry history is detailed at https://www.emptywheel.net/2017/03/17/ron-wydens-history-of-bogus-excuses-for-not-counting-702-us-person-collection.

 

Contact:
Alex Marthews
National Chair, Restore the Fourth
rt4chair@protonmail.com
781-258-2936

Jonathan Capra
Communications Chair,
Restore the Fourth
fongaboo@protonmail.com

November 3, 2017Restore the Fourth (RT4) and the Identity Project (IDP) have collaboratively submitted their formal comments to the U.S. Department of State regarding Proposed Information Collection: Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants. This supplementary procedure would subject certain applicants for visas for admission to the United States to the following additional inquiry items:

  • Travel history during the last fifteen years, including source of funding for travel
  • Address history during the last fifteen years
  • Employment history during the last fifteen years
  • All passport numbers and country of issuance held by the applicant
  • Names and dates of birth for all siblings
  • Name and dates of birth for all children
  • Names and dates of birth for all current and former spouses, or civil or domestic partners
  • Social media platforms and identifiers, also known as handles, used during the last five years
  • Phone numbers and email addresses used during the last five years

RT4 and IDP address conflicts between this proposed policy and the U.S. Constitution, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). This practice stands to encroach on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.

The proposed inquiries stand to be lacking in specificity or granularity. How comprehensive is the request for emails, phone numbers, and ‘social media’ handles? What is considered ‘social media’ in the absence of any statutory, regulatory, or legal definition? For example, is an applicant expected to remember every web site on which they have registered as a commenter? Are applicants expected to obtain and provide cellphone tower location tracking logs? Public transit or road-toll RFID-chip movement logs? License-plate reader motor vehicle movement logs? In-vehicle GPS logs? Or “merely” airline, train, intercity bus, and/or hotel reservation and ticketing records?

These additional inquiries exposes applicants to guilt by association based on family members, domestic partners, or people who provide funds for travel. They also expose applicants to legal sanctions in their home countries. For instance, Saudi Arabia is a U.S. ally with which the U.S. Department of State might be expected to share information obtained through this collection of information. This could include information that could identity Saudi Arabian citizens or residents who have engaged in activities protected by the First Amendment but are considered capital crimes in their homeland, such as blasphemy.

The Department of State has been processing visa applications for almost two centuries without requiring this information. It is not necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Department of State.

 

Congress faces a deadline of December 31, when the main authority for NSA’s mass surveillance programs, Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, expires. This provision retroactively legalized President Bush’s illegal mass surveillance, with few limitations. Three bills have been introduced to renew and reform this authority in varying degrees.
  1. The Senate Intelligence Committee leadership’s “FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act” would renew Section 702 for eight years, explicitly codifies the use of intelligence data for domestic surveillance and to investigate domestic crimes unrelated to terrorism, and is being debated in secret.
    • RECOMMENDATION: KILL IT WITH FIRE
  2. The House Judiciary Committee leadership’s “USA Liberty Act” would improve the administration of the FISA Court but would renew Section 702 for 5.5 years without fixing the FBI backdoor searches problem, where the FBI uses searches of NSA data to get around the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
    • RECOMMENDATION: ALSO KILL WITH FIRE
  3. Now we come to the only realistic proposal on the table that would actually go a long way to fix the problems with Section 702 surveillance: Sen. Wyden’s and Sen. Paul’s just-introduced “USA RIGHTS Act.” It has also been introduced in the House by Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), Rep. Ted Poe (R-TX) and Rep. Beto O’Rourke (D-TX).

SB21, a California state ordinance that will mandate extensive oversight of police surveillance technology, is just two votes from being penned into law.

Restore the Fourth is urging all Californians, on behalf of Oakland Privacy, to contact state representatives by Friday to urge them to bring the bill out of suspense for Gov. Brown to sign.

You can contact the governor and your state representative here. But more importantly, we urge you to reach out to the following representatives by phone or on Twitter – especially ones marked with an asterisk(*).

PLEASE CALL OR TWEET and tell them to vote FOR SB 21.</span?

*Lorena Gonzalez-Fletcher (chair) – Tel: (916) 319-2080

Frank Bigelow (vice chair) – Tel: (916) 319-2005

*Richard Bloom – Tel: (916) 319-2050

*Raul Bocanegra – Tel: (916) 319-2039

*Rob Bonta – Tel: (916) 319-2018

William Brough – Tel: (916) 319-2073

Ian Calderon – Tel: (916) 319-2057

Ed Chau – Tel: (916) 319-2049

*Susan Talamantes Eggman – Tel: (916) 319-2013

Vince Fong – Tel: (916) 319-2034

*Laura Friedman – Tel: (916) 319-2043

James Gallagher – Tel: (916) 319-2003

*Eduardo Garcia -Tel: (916) 319-2056

*Adam Gray – Tel: (916) 319-2021

Reginald Jones-Sawyer  – Tel: (916) 319-2059

Jay Olbernolte – Tel: (916) 319-2033

Eloise Gomez Reyes – Tel: (916) 319-2047

(Tweets to cut and paste):

Please release #SB21 from suspense to end secret mass police #surveillance in CA @LorenaAD80 @JonesSawyer59 @AsmRichardBloom @AsmBocanegra

Please release #SB21 from suspense to end secret mass police #surveillance in CA @RobBonta @IanCalderon @AsmEdChau @AsmSusanEggman 

Please release #SB21 from suspense to end secret mass police #surveillance in CA @AsmEGarciaAD56 @AdamGrayCA @reyes4assembly 

Please release #SB21 from suspense to end secret mass police #surveillance in CA @laurafriedman43 @FrankBigelowCA @vfong @J_GallagherAD3 

Please release #SB21 from suspense to end secret mass police #surveillance in CA @JayObernolte @BillBroughCA 

Tuesday, August 8th, 2017 – Restore the Fourth has filed an amicus curiae in the case of Timothy Ivory Carpenter v. United States of America. In this case, cell-site location information (CSLI) was obtained by subpoena from a cellphone carrier pertaining to the suspect’s cellphone.

In submitting this brief, we seek to urge the court on the following points:

  • From the nature of CSLI, it can be derived that privacy is relational: That is, that even when people disclose their information to third parties, that should not mean that they do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
  • CSLI will become more revealing over time: This is due to the increasing density of tower locations, and the increased power of computers to algorithmically parse a given set of information on people’s locations to predict where they will be in the future.
  • Police use of CSLI comes with a high risk of abuse: Such as, usage for LOVEINT (ie. officials with access to government surveillance and data collections utilizing it to spy on lovers, exes, etc.), police concealment of stingray use, and precedents for CLSI used to harass political dissidents abroad.

For these reasons, we urge that the Court should adopt a warrant standard for governmental searches and seizures of CSLI. We hope that the Court will see Carpenter v. USA as an opportunity to make a much-needed reexamination of the ‘third-party doctrine.’

Restore the Fourth would like to thank our counsel, Mahesha Subbaraman, of Subbaraman PLLC, for contributing this brief.

 

Please contact:

Alex Marthews

National Chair

rt4chair@protonmail.com

(781) 258-2936

You can tell a government is terrified when they punish people who reveal the truth.

NSA contractor Reality Winner was arrested just over a month ago, for leaking to The Intercept internal NSA documents showing what NSA believed to be Russian military intelligence efforts to penetrate US voting systems. She is being held without bail, and charged with offenses carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years in jail and $250,000 in fines.

The law she is being charged under, the “Espionage Act”, is a repressive WWI-era law that criminalizes leaks irrespective of whether they are to the press or a foreign power. The Nixon administration used it to prosecute Daniel Ellsberg for releasing the Pentagon Papers, that revealed that the American public and Congress had been lied to about the Vietnam War. Since the advent of the digital age, under President Obama, the increased ease of leaking secret documents led to the revival of the Espionage Act as a tool to intimidate `insider threats.’ Chelsea Manning was convicted under the Espionage Act, and her sentence was commuted after six long years. Edward Snowden was indicted under the Espionage Act four years ago for revealing perhaps the greatest violation of our 4th Amendment rights, and remains a fugitive. Julian Assange, if extradited to the US, would likely be indicted under the same law.

The Espionage Act, originally intended to protect against foreign spies and their aides, has become a tool for the deep state to crack down on anything that might embarrass it. We don’t believe that keeping our newly digitized secrets requires terrorizing government employees into silence; instead, it requires running a clean and transparent government that refrains from criminality, and protects whistleblowing as a crucial internal corrective.

 

3 Ways to Get Involved

 

Rulings in Ziglar and Hernandez: The Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment and the `Special Factor’ of `National Security’

In Hernandez v. Mesa and Ziglar v. Abbasi, two just-decided cases, the Supreme Court has now made it such that individuals wishing to obtain damages from agents of the federal government for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights have very limited avenues left to do so.

These claims are called “Bivens claims”, after the 1971 Supreme Court case Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents, which was a suit for damages against agents who conducted an unreasonable, warrantless search of a private home, using excessive force. Under Ziglar, any new case not closely (or even, for Justice Thomas, “precisely”) resembling the situation in Bivens must be subjected to a broad-ranging `special factors’ test as to whether the courts should `hesitate’ to create a new ground for Bivens claims. New types of claims, Ziglar suggests, should be denied if Congress has not signaled support for such claims. Bivens claims are not “a proper vehicle for altering an entity’s policy” and are “not designed to hold officers responsible for acts of their subordinates.” If brought directly against executive officials for their own actions, a successful claim would “interfere with sensitive Executive Branch functions” of policy deliberation. If the claim would involve inquiry into “national-security policy, hesitation is warranted, because that “is the prerogative of Congress and the President.” The “proper balance in situations like this, between deterring constitutional violations and freeing high officials to make the lawful decisions necessary to protect the Nation in times of great peril, is one for the Congress to undertake, not the Judiciary.” This is a substantial extension from the “special factors” cited to in Bivens, which suggested hesitation only in cases involving “federal fiscal policy”, cases where the agent’s conduct was “contrary to no constitutional prohibition”, and cases where Congress had barred money damages in particular.

One issue here, among many, is that “national-security policy” now, relative to 1971, is used to cover a vast array of activities by the federal government. Infrastructure? Sure. Global warming? Absolutely. Border policy? Why not?

Beyond that, “national security” is the constant refrain of those in government who seek to conceal merely embarrassing or unpopular conduct. National security, as the Ninth Circuit has put it in this year’s `travel ban’ cases, is often used as a “talismanic incantation that, once invoked, can support any and all exercise of executive power[.]” Such talismanic uses deserve increased alertness from the courts, not increased deference. In truth, no Supreme Court decision, in our current hegemonic situation, is capable of rendering the executive unable to defend the country. Our military is well-founded and technologically advanced; there is no prospect of foreign invasion.

Since “national security” is such an interpretive inkblot, asking courts to accept or deny damages claims on the basis of it leads only to arbitrary decisions based on judges’ prior biases. One could as easily argue that detention of Muslims without charge (Ziglar) or a CBP agent shooting a Mexican teenager harms national security as hurts it. When dealing with such a protean concept, any argument is possible; Ziglar’s novel inclusion of “national security” as a “special factor counseling hesitation” is highly dangerous and overbroad.

In Hernandez¸ a 15-year-old Mexican national was shot in a culvert from across the invisible line separating the U. S. from Mexico, by a border agent, and his surviving family wished to bring a Bivens claim for damages under the Fourth Amendment. However, the Fourth Amendment is often conceived of as being primarily a collective right that pertains only to those who have acted to make themselves in some sense part of “the people” of the United States (see, for example, the plurality ruling in U. S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez [1990]). As such, it is hard to apply it on behalf of an individual who had never apparently been to the United States, nor taken any steps to render himself part of “the people.” A Guantanamo case, Boumediene v. Bush [2008], did permit non-citizens outside the US to bring a habeas corpus claim. So, when Hernandez was accepted for argument before the Supreme Court, at least four Justices wished to see the following three questions answered:

May qualified immunity be granted or denied based on facts—such as the victim’s legal status— unknown to the officer at the time of the incident?

Whether the claim in this case may be asserted under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971)?

Does a formalist or functionalist analysis govern the extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unjustified deadly force, as applied to a cross-border shooting of an unarmed Mexican citizen in an enclosed area controlled by the United States?

The Court was able to agree only on the first of these, that the government was mistaken in arguing that Agent Mesa should enjoy “qualified immunity” for his actions, because that immunity could only be based on facts known at the time. They remanded to the lower court the question of whether the claim could be asserted under Bivens in light of Ziglar, heavily hinting that “special factors” would apply.

It is hard to see how even under the new “special factors” envisioned in Ziglar, the situation in Hernandez would require denial of the Bivens claim. The aim of the suit in Hernandez is not to alter policy at the border – indeed, the Customs and Border Police, in light of this case and an analogous Ninth Circuit case, have already revised their policy. The aim of the suit is not to hold Agent Mesa’s superior officers responsible for his own actions. Congress has not barred such suits for damages. Perhaps, the Supreme Court could be viewing border control as an aspect of “national-security policy” to which the Courts should be deferential. However, in this case Agent Mesa is conceded by both sides to have acted contrary to CBP policy in shooting Sergio Hernandez, even if there are arguments about how intentionally he did so. If the Fifth Circuit finds accordingly, it would be possible, even under Ziglar, for them to conclude that a Bivens claim could proceed.

The last and largest of these three questions, on whether a formalist or functionalist analysis governs the extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment, was the main topic of our brief, which argued that the history of claims by non-US persons against US government agents shows that the Constitution does not give power to its agents to arbitrarily deprive non-US persons of life. This question was only really addressed in a dissent authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justice Ginsburg, who tried to construct a basis for allowing a claim by Hernandez’ surviving family because of the “special border-related features” and “limitroph[ic]” nature of the border in the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez area, but their arguments did not secure a majority.

To our disappointment, these rulings, rather than confronting and correcting the adverse consequences of current agency practices, defer their resolution to another day. Eventually, however, even if not explicitly in this case, the Court will have to rule on the third question above, and when they do, it will be fascinating.

Please join our partners at Demand Progress and sign their petition to let Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act expire at the end of this year.

Restore the Fourth has been a strong critic of the secretive practices this section allows, due to the potential to allow end-runs around restrictions prohibiting targeting domestic communications of American citizens. We need to close this remaining loophole that still provides an avenue for warrantless dragnets. Let your representatives know that they need to let this clearly unconstitutional practice end.

We thank our allies at Demand Progress for providing this channel to our representatives.

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